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James M. Cooper
The United States-Mexico border has long been a place 
of exchange: Mexico was the United States’ third largest 
supplier of goods imports in 2008.1 The U.S. also sends its 
goods to Mexico, its second largest goods export market. 
Other things cross the border: people, capital, technology, 
services, contraband goods, even human and plant 
diseases. With each year, the border changes in complexity 
and composition. 
For decades, the north of Mexico, with Tijuana as its 
emblem, has been a place where United States Servicemen 
and other U.S. tourists go to enjoy “rest and relaxation” 
with cheap drinks and adult entertainment. It is a place 
where U.S. teenagers travel to consume alcohol, taking 
advantage of lax enforcement of the minimum drinking 
age. Before the violence of the drug cartels escalated, 
some 5.000 teenagers would go each weekend through 
the San Ysidro Point of Entry into Tijuana for a night of 
partying. Increasingly, it is the elderly who make their way 
“south” to buy less-regulated gene and stem cell therapy, 
and less expensive medications, dental care, and plastic 
surgery. Tijuana is the destination for lower cost lifestyle 
expenses – for a vacation or for health, orthodontic and 
other beautification services. In addition to its elderly 
and sick people, the U.S. has also exported a culture of 
consumption. It is not just children in the United States 
1 | Office of the United States Trade Representative, U.S.-Mexico 
 Trade Facts, http://ustr.gov/countries-regions/americas/
 mexico (accessed June 2, 2010). 
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The mexican side of the border is a de-
stination for military-style assault we-
apons, grenades, and handguns used 
by narcotraficantes against each other 
and against mexican law enforcement 
authorities.
who are suffering with obesity. Childhood obesity is now an 
epidemic in Mexico, as it has been in the U.S. for years.2
The United States also sends its guns south. The Mexican 
side of the border is a destination for military-style assault 
weapons, grenades, and handguns used by narcotra-
ficantes against each other and against 
Mexican law enforcement authorities. With 
submarines and tunnels, the narcotraficantes 
have stepped up their game. Mexico is the 
destination for U.S. attack helicopters and 
high tech surveillance tools that have been 
specially ordered by Mexican police and military authorities 
for use against the drug traffickers themselves. This is 
driven in part by the joint U.S. and Mexican Mérida Initi-
ative to bring an end to the terror that the narcotraficantes 
have inflicted upon Mexico’s civil society. The U.S.-Mexico 
border is a place where much of that expensive gear is in 
use. The corridor is now a major draw for technology – 
monitoring the border and stemming the flow of illegal 
drugs and undocumented people into the United States. 
The U.S. Navy has even trained Mexican police officials. 
The transfer of technology dates back to the 1960s, when 
the Mexican Government provided incentives to foreign 
investors to set up production facilities along the U.S. 
border to create lower skilled manufacturing jobs. The 
Japanese, Korean, and U.S. multinationals heeded that call 
(and tax deduction). The Mexican side of the border also 
developed into a destination for hundreds of thousands of 
internal migrants – those leaving the subsistence agricul-
tural lives of Southern Mexico for the maquiladoras of 
Ciudad Juárez and Otay Mesa, just east of Tijuana. Migrants 
from Michoacán mingle with their fellow indigenous people 
from Oaxaca and Chiapas as they work on assembly lines 
in the hundreds of these border factories. Occasionally a 
Central American, having survived his or her way through 
Mexico, can be found also vying to make it north of the 
border. They work in maquiladoras, chasing the dream that 
the North America Free Trade Agreement – the trade pact 
among Mexico, the U.S. and Canada – can benefit people, 
and not just corporations, in the expansion of trade and 
2 | Ken Ellingwood, “Mexico faces soaring childhood obesity rate”,
 in: L.A. Times, April 25, 2010, A3.
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Corporations took advantage of tax 
benefits, but then closed down with 
operations moving to China, where 
cheaper labor made it more econo-
mical for globalized manufacturers to 
operate.
the sharing of benefits from globalization. At least in the 
maquiladoras that are still open since the Chinese took 
many of those jobs in the first decade of this century. 
Since the North American Free Trade Agreement went into 
force on January 1, 1994, the same day as the start of 
the Zapatista uprising in Chiapas, trade among Canada, 
Mexico, and the United States has more than trebled. 
Free trade exists for most products, services, and invest-
ments. Tariffs, quotas, and technical barriers to trade were 
gradually eliminated. Factories were opened 
along the U.S. Mexico border to take advance 
of duty drawbacks and other benefits 
under the regional trade bloc. Companies 
outsourced for lower cost labor and less 
enforced environmental laws. 
Many of these factories lasted only half a decade. Corpora-
tions took advantage of tax benefits, but then closed down 
with operations moving to China, where cheaper labor 
made it more economical for globalized manufacturers to 
operate – even with the shipping costs. The thinking went 
like this: Why pay a Mexican worker 48 to 60 dollars a 
week when you can contract for a Chinese worker at 18 
dollars a week? The question for the Mexican worker then 
became – why be unemployed when you can cross into the 
U.S. and earn 10 dollars an hour doing gardening work or 
building houses in el norte?
The demand for Mexican labor has changed again to favor 
Mexico, given the increased cost of shipping from Asia. 
Mexico is again a place of growth in the manufacturing 
sector, particularly along its northern border with the 
United States. It is no surprise that Mexico’s population 
in the border region has grown exponentially in the last 
several years, much higher than the national average: 
Baja California’s population grew by a factor of fifty 
between 1930 and 2005, and Tijuana’s population alone 
grew at a rate of 3.9 percent (almost double the national 
average in the same period) from 2000 to 2005. The city is 
estimated to expand at a rate of 2.25 hectares a day.3 Out 
3 | Jesus Angel E. Acosta, Migration and Urbanization in North-
 west Mexico’s Border Cities, J. Southwest, 445 (2009), 
 http://www.scribd.com/doc/29444257/Revisiting-Borders-
 Migration-Actors-and-Urbanism (accessed May 19, 2010).
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With the introduction of terrorism and 
car bombs as a tactic against the po-
lice, Ciudad Juárez is becoming more 
dangerous than Baghdad and Kabul.
of the entire population in the border region, an estimated 
41.4 percent were born in another state, twice the national 
average, further showing the weight of border-city 
migration. Nogales and Ciudad Juárez also have enjoyed 
high growth increases, with a majority of their respective 
state’s population focused in these two cities. 
For many, to participate in the global economy meant 
moving from subsistence labor in rural states like Chiapas, 
Zacatecas, and elsewhere to minimum wage assembly 
line work on the Mexican side of the U.S. 
border. The living standards in Mexico have 
improved in some places, but the social dislo-
cation costs associated with urbanization, 
internal migration, and assimilation of entire 
villages and indigenous populations have been heavy. That 
many maquiladora workers live in improvised shantytown 
housing without paved roads, running water, or electricity, 
is also a large problem. These factories were established 
to take advantage of regional value content and other 
tax incentives provided by the Mexican Government. But 
this boom or bust cycle has brought about much social 
dislocation. The murders of hundreds of women in Ciudad 
Juárez, many of them maquiladora workers, remain 
uninvestigated, never mind solved. With the introduction 
of terrorism and car bombs as a tactic against the police, 
Ciudad Juárez is becoming more dangerous than Baghdad 
and Kabul. Public insecurity is assured along the near 
2000-mile border as renewed efforts by Mexican author-
ities to quell the violence come at a time of resurgence of 
the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), judging from 
the July 2010 state and municipal elections. 
This report will detail some of the major issues concerning 
the U.S.-Mexico border and the interconnected nature 
of the problems. It first examines the violence between 
narcotraficantes, that which has resulted in the crackdown 
against them by the Mexican Government through mobili-
zation of the military. The resulting violence and kidnap-
pings have brought about minimal confidence in civilian 
authorities, the administration of justice, and democratic 
governance. This report discusses the resulting public 
insecurity that has afflicted Mexico in the last few years. 
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lots of people cross into the U.s. from 
mexico: indigenous people from sou-
thern mexico and Central america, 
Chinese indentured workers, Brazilian 
surfers, and Ukrainian women lured 
into prostitution.
This has had an immeasurable impact on the border region 
as upper middle class and even middle class Mexicans 
flee north to escape the violence. The border is not just 
for Mexicans to cross, of course. Lots of people cross into 
the U.S. from Mexico: Indigenous people from Southern 
Mexico and Central America, Chinese inden-
tured workers being trafficked by snake-
heads to sell pirated goods in Los Angeles’ 
The Alley, Brazilian surfers en route for the 
swells of Southern California, and Ukrainian 
women lured into prostitution – all interact 
with the border. This report explores the 
economic contours along the U.S. border, and the reactions 
of the U.S. Government to what is happening in the north 
part, and at times, the entire country to the south. It then 
examines the clampdown on illegal immigration, and the 
border security-homeland defense industries.4 Lastly, this 
report then explores how, despite all the nastiness, the 
U.S.-Mexico border remains a place of hope and courage. 
naRCoTRafiCanTes
One cannot underestimate the dynamics of drug trafficking 
on the U.S.-Mexico border. Because of the endemic 
poverty in Mexico, it is no surprise that the huge profits 
that come with drug trafficking are very alluring. Since 
the early 1980s, Mexico has been economically dependant 
on the illicit narcotic industry, which is estimated to net 
some thirty to fifty billion dollars per year.5 As much as 
90 percent of the cocaine entering the United States now 
transits through Mexico.6 The drug cartels have become 
increasingly sophisticated and powerful. They dominate 
illegal drug markets in the U.S. – the tons of cocaine, 
methamphetamine, marijuana, heroin, and MDMA that 
4 | Reuters, US security firms vie for Mexico drug war contracts, 
 Reuters, July 16, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/
 idUSN14196362 (accessed July 14, 2010).
5 | Charles Bowden, U.S.-Mexico ‘war on drugs’ a failure, CNN,  
 April 2, 2010, http://www.cnn.com/2010/OPINION/03/31/
 bowden.ciudad.juarez.cartels/index.html (accessed May 9, 
 2010).
6 | Dep’t of State, 2009 Int’l Narcotics Control Strategy Report:
 Vol. I, 414 (March 2009), http://www.state.gov/documents/
 organization/120054.pdf (accessed May 19, 2010), herein-
 after “Dep’t of State, 2009 Int’l Narcotics Report 2009”.
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The illicit drug industry has made the 
U.s.-mexico border a fundamentally 
lawless and dangerous place.
are imported into the country annually.7 A steady stream of 
soldiers is ready to fight other cartels and the authorities, 
and take over when cartel leaders are 
arrested or killed. A subculture has emerged 
with its own corridos (traditional folkloric 
songs), telenovelas, jewelry, apparel, and 
even mausoleums that glamorize the lifestyle of the 
narcotraficantes. But aside from these questionable contri-
butions to popular culture, the illicit drug industry has 
made the U.S. Mexico border a fundamentally lawless and 
dangerous place.8 
Violence has significantly increased as transit routes 
for drugs from Colombia are fought over by competing 
cartels.9 The narcotraficantes – Mexico’s main drug 
trafficking organizations including the Gulf, Sinaloa, 
and the Juárez cartels10 – have formed alliances with 
other cartels and with each other, employed street gang 
members as enforcers, or sicarios, and corrupted law 
enforcement officials nationwide. Notably, the Gulf cartel 
has become a powerful militia by enlisting the Zetas, a 
group of disaffected former paramilitary troops. This gang 
has been joined by corrupt federal, state, and local law 
enforcement officers to become kidnappers, drug dealers, 
money launderers, and assassins for Osiel Cárdenas’ Gulf 
cartel. Following suit, the Sinaloa cartel, an ally of the 
Juárez cartel, recruited the Negros and Pelones armed 
7 | Bureau for Int’l Narcotics and Law Enforcement Aff. (INL), 
 U.S. Dep’t of State, Int’l Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 
 Vol. 1 at 432-38, (March 2010), http://www.state.gov/
 documents/organization/137411.pdf (accessed May 9, 2010), 
 hereinafter “INL Report”; U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Nat’l Drug 
 Intelligence Ctr., Nat’l Drug Threat Assessment, № 2010-
 Q0317-001, (2010), http://www.justice.gov/ndic/pubs38/
 38661/38661p.pdf (accessed September 2, 2010).
8 | Agnes Gereben Schaefer, Benjamin Bahney, K. Jack Riley, 
 Security in Mexiko. Implications for U.S. Options (2009), 
 hereinafter “Rand Corporation, http://www.rand.org/pubs/
 monographs/2009/RAND_MG876.pdf (accessed June 27, 
 2010).
9 | INL Report, n. 7; U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Nat’l Drug 
 Intelligence Ctr., Nat’l Drug Threat Assessment, № 2010-
 Q0317-001, (2010), http://www.justice.gov/ndic/pubs38/
 38661/38661p.pdf. Cf. http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/
 R40582_20090515.pdf (both accessed September 2, 2010).
10 | Colleen W. Cook, U.S. Cong. Research Serv., Mexico’s Drug 
 Cartels, RL34215, CRS Rep. for Cong., (October 16, 2007), 
 available at http://ftp.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34215.pdf 
 (accessed May 9, 2010).
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from the moment he became head of 
government, mexican president felipe 
Calderón has waged a war against the 
narcotraficantes.
enforcement gangs and allegedly enjoy police protection. 
The playing field is constantly changing and so is the death 
toll. Corruption runs deeply as major institutions have 
been rocked by scandals involving senior officials in the 
payroll of the drug cartels. There is now much talk over 
July 2010’s elections and the narco connections that many 
PRI candidates are alleged to have had. 
Then there is the violence from the Mexican authorities, 
including the military. From the moment he became head 
of government, Mexican President Felipe Calderón has 
waged a war against the narcotraficantes.11 
He deployed some forty thousand military 
troops to prosecute this fight.12 There have 
been some victories along the way: In 2009 
the Mexican Government arrested 36,332 
people and seized twenty metric tons of cocaine, 1,385 
metric tons of marijuana, 665 kilograms of opium gum, 
and 277 kilograms of heroin.13 Roadblocks, massive uses 
of force, and smarter intelligence have netted bigger 
loads of illicit drug en route to the United States. With 
this remarkable success, there also emerged egregious 
violence and some say there were human atrocities on 
the part of military forces against the civilian population.14 
Over 1,500 of such complaints have been registered with 
the National Human Rights Commission.15 To date, over 
23,000 people have been killed since December 2006 when 
Felipe Calderón was sworn in as President of Mexico.16 In 
11 | Cf. Rand Corporation, n. 8, 31.
12 | Human Rights Watch, Uniform Impunity: Mexico’s Misuse of 
 Military Justice to Prosecute Abuses in Counternarcotics and 
 Public Security Operations 2 (2009), hereinafter “Human 
 Rights Watch, Uniform Impunity”.
13 | INL, n. 7, 434.
14 | Cf. generally Oscar Hidalgo, “Mexican Drug Trafficking”, in: 
 N.Y. Times, March 24, 2010, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/
 news/international/countriesandterritories/mexico/drug_
 trafficking/index.html (accessed May 10, 2010); INL, n. 7; 
 Cook, n. 10; Bowden, n. 5.
15 | Cf. National Human Rights Commission (CNDH), Annual 
 Reports, www.cndh.org.mx (accessed September 2, 2010).
16 | “Mexico Under Siege”, in: L.A. Times, May 30, 2010, 
 http://projects.latimes.com/mexico-drug-war/#/its-a-war 
 (accessed May 30, 2010). Cf. Ben Conery and Jerry Seper, 
 “Border Violence Threatens the Americans”, in: Washington 
 Times, April 1, 2010, available at http://washingtontimes.com/
 news/2010/apr/01/violent-mexican-drug-gangs-pose-rising-
 risk-to-ame/ (accessed May 10, 2010); Arthur Brice, Mexican 
 president visits troubled Ciudad, CNN, March 16, 2010.
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Ciudad Juárez is mexico’s most violent 
city. as cartels battle for the city, a 
corridor for drug shipments to the U.s. 
in the state of Chihuahua, more vio-
lence is in the offing.
2009 alone, over 8,000 people were killed, half of them in 
states along the U.S.-Mexico border.17 Drug-related killings 
are highly concentrated in a few states of Mexico: In 2008, 
more than 60 percent of the killings were in three cities: 
Tijuana, Culiacán and Ciudad Juárez, all along the U.S.-
Mexico border.18 These are clearly the strategic locations 
for drugs and weapons trafficking to and from the United 
States.
Ciudad Juárez, Mexico’s most violent city, has suffered a 
death toll of 2,600 in 2009, with another four hundred so 
far in 2010.19 On January 31, 2010, a shootout claimed 
the lives of 15 people, many of whom were students with 
no connections to the drug gangs. On March 13, 2010, 
a U.S. Consulate official, her husband, and 
an Arizona rancher were killed when gunmen 
shot at their vehicles. The Aztecas, a street 
gang on both sides of the U.S.-Mexico border, 
was contracted by La Linea, the Juárez 
cartel’s armed wing, to complete the targeted 
assassinations.20 The first weekend of May 2010, twenty-
four people were killed in the span of twenty-four hours. 
Because of police complicity and inefficiency, a string of 
unsolved murders of young women, many former workers 
in maquiladoras, remain unsolved. As cartels battle for the 
city, a corridor for drug shipments to the U.S. in the state 
of Chihuahua, more violence is in the offing.21 Car bombs 
have now been used as a tactic by the narcos.22
17 | U.S. Dep’t of State, Background Notes: Mexico, (May 2010), 
 http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35749.htm (accessed May 
 19, 2010).
18 | June S. Beittel, U.S. Cong. Research Serv., Mexico’s Drug-
 Related Violence, R40582, http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/
 R40582_20090515.pdf (accessed May 15, 2010).
19 | 17-year old amongst victims in Juárez shootout, CNN, April
 24, 2010, http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/americas/
 04/23/juarez.shootout/index.html (accessed May 10, 2010).
20 | Ken Ellingwood, “Suspect held in U.S. consulate worker’s 
 killing”, in: L.A. Times, July 3, 2010, A10.
21 | Nick Valencia, Mexican Drug Violence Claims 24 lives in 24 
 hours, CNN, May 2, 2010, http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/
 americas/05/02/mexico.drug.violence/index.html (accessed 
 May 11, 2010).
22 | Tracy Wilkinson, “Cartel car bomb kills four”, in: L.A. Times, 
 July 17, 2010, A7.
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despite arrests, cartels continue to 
exercise power, often en masse. Clearly, 
the mexican Government does not have 
the monopoly of force in much of the 
country.
pUBliC inseCURiTy: a neW expoRT indUsTRy?
The U.S.-Mexico border remains a very dangerous place. 
On June 28, 2010, gunmen killed Rodolfo Torre, the Guber-
natorial candidate for the Institutional Revolutionary Party 
(or PRI) who was expected to win the election in Tamaulipas 
only a few days later.23 Tamaulipas is on 
Texas’ southeastern border and has been 
the site of fighting between the Gulf cartel 
and the Zetas. The violence has now spread 
beyond the U.S.-Mexico border region to 
other parts of the country as the narcotra-
ficantes fight each other. A few examples tell the story: 
Some 50 hooded gunmen took over a Monterrey hotel and 
terrorized guests.24 Four people were killed in an ambush 
of the security minister of Michoacán.25 In Morelos, nearly 
50 people died in gunfights and drug violence.26 Despite 
arrests, cartels continue to exercise power, often en 
masse.27 Clearly, the Mexican Government does not have 
the monopoly of force in much of the country, so endemic 
is the culture of corruption, and now, violence. 
The drug cartels have unquestionably penetrated law 
enforcement, policy-making circles, and the military over 
the years. Public security has eroded trust in the admin-
istration of justice and in the law enforcement commu-
nity.28 Some are even calling Mexico a “failed state”.29 
Such insecurity repels tourism, foreign direct investment, 
and general economic growth. The Mexican economy is 
expected to contract another 5.5 percent in 2010. 
In the last few years, drug addiction has also become a 
domestic problem in Mexico. With the new vigilance along 
23 | Ken Ellingwood, “Gunmen kill PRI candidate”, in: L.A. Times, 
 June 29, 2010, A3.
24 | Ken Ellingwood, “Monterrey hotel raised by gunmen”, in: 
 L.A. Times, Apr. 22, 2010, A3.
25 | Tracy Wilkinson, “4 killed in ambush of state official”, in: 
 L.A. Times, Apr. 25, 2010, A4.
26 | Ken Ellingwood, “Morelos state caught in a cartel succession 
 battle”, in: L.A. Times, Apr. 21, 2010, A3.
27 | Richard A. Serrano, “Cartels rattled but not bowed by U.S.”, 
 in: L.A. Times, Apr. 26, 2010, A1.
28 | Human Rights Watch, Uniform Impunity, 4.
29 | Joel Kurtzman, “Mexico’s Instability a Real Problem”, in: Wall 
 Street Journal, January 16, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/
 article/SB123206674721488169.html (accessed June 29, 2010).
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firearm smuggling from the U.s. to me-
xico is blamed for fostering the cartels’ 
access to weapons that feed the drug 
war. U.s. purchased or stolen firearms 
account for an estimated 95 percent of 
mexico’s drug-related killings.
the border, drugs intended for the United States have been 
interrupted. The drugs have had to go somewhere, so a 
Mexican consumer base was the next best thing to a U.S. 
consumer base. For decades, the Mexican Government 
had a pact with Mexican narcotraficantes: The narcos 
could transport the contraband that originated from South 
America and transited through Central America and the 
Caribbean as long as the illicit drugs were not distributed 
to Mexicans. This pact ended in 2000 when Vicente Fox 
assumed the presidency.
The decreased flow of drug cartels shipments has forced 
the narcotraficantes to look for other forms of revenue. 
It is no surprise that kidnapping in the border region 
has become a growth industry – particularly in Tijuana. 
Kidnapping has become a default activity for Mexican 
organized crime syndicates. So lucrative an enterprise, 
the police have increasingly often involved in kidnapping 
throughout the beleaguered country, forcing 
business people and their families to flee 
north, with visas or without. Unfortunately, 
the kidnapping industry has spilled over the 
U.S.-Mexico border too. The Federal Bureau 
of Investigation has opened dozens of cases 
of kidnapping which involved victims being 
taken in San Diego, California, and forcibly brought south 
across the border and held for ransom. 
Firearm smuggling from the U.S. to Mexico is blamed for 
fostering the cartels’ access to weapons that feed the 
drug war. U.S. purchased or stolen firearms account for 
an estimated 95 percent of Mexico’s drug-related killings.30 
The Mexican Government estimates that over 2,000 
firearms are smuggled daily, a number that has increased 
since the federal ban on assault weapons in the U.S. 
expired in 2004.31 But due to heightened efforts by the 
Calderón Administration, the number of guns confiscated 
has dramatically increased. It is too bad for U.S. weapons 
brokers along the border, as gun sales are a growth 
industry, particularly for a growing market: Mexico. 
30 | Dep’t of State, 2009 Int’l Narcotics Report 2009, n. 6.
31 | Congressional Research Service, Mexico’s Drug-Related 
 Violence 15 (2009), http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40582_
 20090515.pdf (accessed May 15, 2010).
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The Zapatista uprising, which quickly 
became the darling of the new left, 
was the first of many protests against 
globalization, as expressed in multila-
teral and bilateral trade pacts.
Bribery has run rampant. Transparencia Mexicana, a 
leading non-governmental organization, reported in its 
2007 National Index on Corruption and Good Governance 
that there were 197 million acts of corruption in Mexico 
that year, up from 115 million in 2005.32 Foreign direct 
investment declined with the global economic crisis. The 
economy in Mexico shrank 6.5 percent in 2009.33 It is 
estimated to contract again in the first quarter of 2010.34 
The continued lack of public security along the border is not 
good for business. Neither was the Zapatista 
rebellion in Chiapas which protested the 
signing of NAFTA, the trade agreement that 
Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional 
leader Subcomandante Marcos called “a 
death sentence for the indigenous people”.35 
The fear was over the lack of land reform and the mecha-
nization of agribusiness that would put small plot farmers 
and landless people out of work and unable to afford even 
their own food. The Zapatista uprising, which quickly 
became the darling of the new Left in Europe and other 
alter- and anti-globalists, was the first of many protests 
against globalization, as expressed in multilateral and 
bilateral trade pacts. 
 
eConomiC ConToURs in mexiCo and 
The UniTed sTaTes
When NAFTA went into force in 1994, Canada, Mexico and 
the United States were to lower tariff barriers and other 
obstacles to the marketplace. The trade agreement among 
Canada, Mexico, and the United States has proven helpful 
to multinationals. Large trucking companies, low-skill 
32 | Transparencia Mexicana, Informe Executivo, Indice Nacional 
 de Corrupción y Bueno Gobernio (2007), INCBG p. 5, 
 http://www.transparenciamexicana.org.mx/ENCBG/ 
 (accessed July 13, 2010).
33 | Brookings Institution, Beyond the Crisis? Thinking Strategi-
 cally About Mexico’s Economic Future, June 25, 2010, 
 http://www.brookings.edu/events/2010/0625_mexico_
 economy.aspx?rssid=mexico (accessed July 14, 2010).
34 | President Calderón predicted a three percent increase in 
 Gross Domestic Product for 2010. Emily Schmall, Mexico to 
 grow at least three percent in 2010, Calderon says, Bloom-
 berg News, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=
 newsarchive&sid=ay3BX0m2iFDI (accessed July 14, 2010).
35 | Medea Benjamin, “Interview: Subcomandante Marcos”, in: 
 First Worold, Ha Ha Ha! The Zapatista Challenge, 57-70 
 (Elaine Katzenberger ed., 1995), 67.
46 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 10|2010
as U.s. labor costs remained high, un-
able to compete with new commercial 
entities on a global scale, it also saw 
U.s. workers were displaced in the 
global marketplace and at home by lo-
wer cost, undocumented labor.
manufacturers, insurance, agriculture, telecommunica-
tions, and other commodities providers did well entering 
Mexico. The U.S. financial sector also did well when 
it bought up the Mexican financial sector, a protected 
industry pre-NAFTA. Other winners from NAFTA include the 
largest importers and exporters, supply chain managers, 
and insurance companies. Manufacturing and agriculture 
industries have helped increase exports. Government 
procurement, services, and agriculture were opened to 
international competitors. State subsidies for staple foods 
were gradually removed and agribusiness moved into 
Mexico, pushing out small plot owners and subsistence 
farmers. These campesinos had to leave their land as 
agribusiness arrived with higher yields, monopolistic 
supply chains, and market manipulation, moving north to 
find jobs, hopefully something stable like a maquiladora. 
With NAFTA factories would be staffed by 
low-skilled Mexican workers while higher-
skilled U.S. workers invented everything – 
the software, film and other media and 
entertainment products, telecommunica-
tions, biotechnology, and other advanced 
industries. All of this relied on Intellectual Property, and all 
of it lucrative for the communities and individuals involved. 
This post-industrial economy may have worked if China and 
India had not begun competing seriously with subsidized 
European innovators to take on this U.S.-driven model of 
utilizing innovation to be an engine for economic growth. 
As U.S. labor costs remained high, unable to compete with 
new commercial entities on a global scale, it also saw U.S. 
workers were displaced in the global marketplace and at 
home by lower cost, undocumented labor.
Mexico has suffered an eight percent drop in Gross Domestic 
Product due to the financial crisis. The manufacturing 
sector, which accounts for about 30 percent of Mexico’s 
Gross Domestic Product, contracted in real terms in 2009. 
Construction dropped by 7.5 percent in real terms as well. 
Tourism is down. PEMEX, the Mexican national petroleum 
company, does not have money to invest in supply chain 
maintenance so energy reserves are continually depleted. 
But Mexico has endured financial crises in the past: The 
bank failures and nationalization of 1982 and the peso 
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Remittances from mexicans in the U.s. 
declined by a significant 16 percent in 
2009. This money is critical to assist 
families in mexico as most remittances 
are spent on immediate consumption 
needs there.
devaluation of 1994 when the property market bubble 
burst come to mind. 
The financial crisis has also deeply hit the United States, 
even if it missed the damage done in 1982 and 1994 
(except as a lender). The people along the 
U.S.-Mexico border have especially suffered. 
The collapse of the housing sector decimated 
the construction and renovation industries 
in the United States, resulting in the loss of 
jobs, not just of U.S. workers but particu-
larly undocumented people from Mexico 
and elsewhere in the Americas who had increasingly been 
doing this work in the United States. It is no surprise then 
that remittances, the Mexico’s second-largest source of 
foreign currency after oil,36 have dropped. Remittances 
from Mexicans in the U.S. are well below their estimated 
23 billion dollars in 2008 (and 26 billion dollars in 2007), 
declining by a significant 16 percent in 2009. This money 
is critical to assist families in Mexico as most remittances 
are spent on immediate consumption needs there. Foreign 
Direct Investment from the United States into Mexico, 
which was three billion dollars in 1993, a year before 
NAFTA, reached 23 billion dollars in 2008, only to be 
reduced to 11.6 billion dollars in 2009. 
The crisis really signaled the end of the Mexican-American 
or Mexican dream of owning a home in the United States.37 
The Hispanic community is overrepresented among houses 
in Southern California that went into foreclosure. In 
addition, many Mexican families contributed to the down 
payment on the purchase of a home, often without legal 
permission to live and work in the United States, and 
used merely a Mexican cédula for identification in the loan 
application process. There are many cases of fraud among 
mortgage brokers and crimes perpetrated by unsavory 
representatives, often Mexican or Mexican-American 
themselves. 
36 | U.S. Dep’t of State, Background Notes: Mexico, (May 2010) 
 http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35749.htm (accessed 
 May 19, 2010).
37 | Cf. Demetrios G. Papademetriou and Aaron Terrazas, Immi-
 grants and the Current Economic Crisis: Research Evidence, 
 Policy Challenges, and Implications (Migration Policy Institute 
 2009, http://www.ime.gob.mx/ime2/2008/mig_immigrants_
 current_economic_crisis.pdf (accessed June 2, 2010).
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human smuggling is particularly risky 
for female immigrants. six out of ten 
migrant women and girls are sexually 
violated.
In today’s globalized world, the public insecurity and 
endemic poverty in Mexico force the working age population 
to seek economic opportunities in the United States. In 
the lead up to NAFTA being agreed upon by the Parties, 
the sales pitch from the three governments was that there 
would be jobs created. But the job creation in Mexico was 
clearly not enough to stem the economic flight of young 
people from Mexico to the United States. Daily, hundreds 
of people are smuggled into the U.S. from Mexico through 
ports of entry, tunnels, and in the extreme 
weather and topography of the desert. The 
drug cartels, Chinese snakeheads, and 
Central American maras have forced their 
cargo, the illegal immigrants, into lives of 
economic exploitation and virtual slavery.38 If coyotes (paid 
guides, facilitators of illegal crossings) are employed, the 
situation can turn into a kidnapping, forced labor, or some 
other relationship of duress.39 Human smuggling is particu-
larly risky for female immigrants.40 Approximately six out 
of ten migrant women and girls are sexually violated.41 
Mexican authorities themselves target internal migrants 
from Southern Mexico and those from Central American 
countries en route to the north, many by train. 
The real winners in the economics of NAFTA have been 
the multinational corporations, particularly those attached 
to border security, homeland defense, and the prison 
industries. They profit from constructing the border fence, 
38 | Josh Meyer, “Drug cartels raise the stakes on human smuggling”,
 in: L.A. Times, March 2, 2009, http://articles.latimes.com/
 2009/mar/23/nation/na-human-smuggling23 (accessed May 
 10, 2010).
39 | Richard Marosi, “Mexico arrests shed light on migrant-kidnap-
 ping outfits”, in: L.A. Times, July 18, 2010, A33.
40 | According to the U.S. State Department, “A significant 
 number of Mexican women, girls, and boys are trafficked 
 within the country for commercial sexual exploitation, lured 
 by false job offers from poor rural regions to urban, border 
 and tourist areas. According to the government, more than 
 20,000 Mexican children are victims of sex trafficking every 
 year, especially in the tourist and border areas.” Cf. U.S. 
 Dep’t of State, Trafficking in Persons Report, 206 (June 2009), 
 http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/123357.pdf 
 (accessed September 2, 2010).
41 | Amnesty International, Widespread Abuse of Migrants in 
 Mexico is ‘Human Rights Crisis’, April 28, 2010, 
 http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/report/
 widespread-abuse-migrants-mexico-human-rights-crisis-
 2010-04-27 (accessed May 11, 2010).
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if mexico would only stop the supply of 
illegal drugs and illegal immigrants to 
the U.s., runs the argument, then the 
problems would be solved.
supplying the technologies to monitor the 1969 miles 
of border, and incarcerating the people caught trying to 
immigrate illegally or work illegally in the United States. 
Privately owned and operated prisons are now the norm 
and no-bid contractors from the War on Terror have built 
incarceration facilities for temporary influxes of migrants.42 
The unions have also done well – swelling their ranks 
among federal employees with government rolls growing.
While much is made of the push factors and pull factors in 
the relationship between Mexico and the United States, it 
is the push back factor that now dominates the headlines 
and public discourse about the border. This push back 
has come in states and municipalities taking on their own 
immigration reform. The push back can also be seen in 
the response from the United States Government in the 
form of military aid to the Mexican security apparatus. 
Instead of working in a meaningful way to facilitate trade 
with Mexico beyond the token increase in trucking lanes at 
the ports of entry along the border and decreased customs 
paperwork, the U.S. Government is approaching the U.S.-
Mexico border through military means. 
The Response fRom The UniTed sTaTes
In dealing with many of these issues involving 
the U.S.-Mexico border, the United States 
Government has responded with its supply-
side solutions. If Mexico would only stop the 
supply of illegal drugs and illegal immigrants to the U.S., 
runs the argument, then the problems would be solved. 
Never mind that there is a huge market in the U.S. for both 
commodities. So we must clampdown on illegal immigration, 
build a bigger border fence between the U.S. and Mexico, 
and militarize the border with more National Guard troops 
to fortify the already increased numbers of U.S. Border 
Patrol agents. This section of the report examines the 
actions taken in the U.S. concerning illegal immigration, 
the increase in troops to monitor the border, and the border 
itself in the form of a primary and secondary fence in places. 
42 | Halliburton Press Releases, KBR awarded U.S. Department of 
 Homeland Security Contingency Support Project for Emergency 
 Support Services, January 24, 2006, http://halliburton.com/
 default/main/halliburton/eng/news/source_files/pressrelease_
 2006.jsp (accessed July 20, 2010). 
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despite much political pressure from 
the hispanic population of the United 
states, the U.s. Government has failed 
to enact a new comprehensive immi-
gration law reform.
Clampdown on illegal immigration
The North American Free Trade Agreement never dealt 
with labor or immigration issues, although a few provisions 
called for professional visas for treaty nationals to work in 
the other countries. Other matters, as with those relating 
to the protection of the environment, were left outside the 
dispute resolution mechanisms set up under NAFTA and 
instead placed into so-called “side agreements”. Mexico 
did not have to rise to the levels of its NAFTA partners. 
The countries in NAFTA needed only to execute their own 
respective national laws. In the case of immigration of 
Mexicans into the U.S., the treaty was silent for the most 
part.
NAFTA did not include labor provisions and provide for 
more open immigration among the three countries because 
Mexicans would flock en masse to the United 
States. And for good reason – they could 
make more money than in Mexico, and with 
far more opportunity for upward mobility. 
NAFTA was supposed to provide jobs. It did 
so but not provide enough of them. So millions of Mexicans 
went looking for work – in the United States. More than 
fifteen million illegal immigrants are estimated to live 
in the United States, the majority from Mexico. Despite 
much political pressure from the Hispanic population 
of the United States, the U.S. Government has failed to 
enact a new comprehensive immigration law reform. They 
have also failed to enforce the laws that exist to punish 
the employers of illegal immigrants and tighten border 
inspections.
The laws that have emerged locally and statewide, as 
in Arizona with State Law SB1070, have demonstrated 
the racist underbelly of many in the United States, and 
provoked an ugly police state reaction in Arizona. On a 
state visit to the White House on May 19, 2010, Mexican 
President Felipe Calderón denounced Arizona’s new 
immigration law (SB1070) as “discriminatory”.43 This new 
Arizona law requires police officers to ask for citizenship 
43 | Jonathan Weisman, “Obama Gets an Earful From Calderón”, 
 in: L.A. Times, May 20, 2010, A4.
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Undocumented migrants still pose si-
gnificant challenges for public servi-
ces including public healthcare. often 
ille gal migrants do not have health in-
surance and use emergency wards as 
primary care visits.
documents and may allow for racial profiling. Arizona is 
not the only state to turn toward state-based immigration 
policy.44 
Without immigration reform at the federal 
level, other jurisdictions and agencies will 
act where the federal government will 
not enforce its own laws to safeguard the 
security of the border and ensure orderly, 
rather than illegal, immigration into the 
United States. We have seen this in ordinances from cities 
like Escondido, California, which have tried to target illegal 
immigrants. For a brief period, it was illegal in Escondido 
to rent an apartment to an undocumented worker. Part of 
the reaction in the United States is racism and part of it 
is the sheer cost of integrating illegal immigrants into the 
U.S. economy. They do contribute to the tax base in many 
ways, but undocumented migrants still pose significant 
challenges for public services including public healthcare 
in the Southwestern United States. Often illegal migrants 
do not have health insurance and use emergency wards as 
primary care visits, costing Los Angeles County 300 million 
dollars in one year. 
Migration, however, has dropped with the onslaught of 
economic crisis.45 Furthermore, enforcement has increased 
along the border and ports of entry – so-called Operation 
“Gatekeeper” – in San Diego. This heightened vigilance 
forced migrants to enter through more dangerous routes 
in Arizona. Still the U.S.-Mexico border remains a very 
dangerous place for human trafficking and the tens of 
thousands of illegal border crossers each month. The U.S. 
Border Patrol has attempted to stem the tide of illegal 
crossing from Mexico (including migrants not only from 
Mexico but also from Central America, Brazil, China, and 
Ukraine), through great numbers, a bigger fence, and the 
employment of new technologies.
44 | Anna Gorman, “Arizona Law is Just One of Many”, in: 
 L.A. Times, July 17, 2010, A1.
45 | Papademetriou and Terrazas, n. 37.
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even Governor arnold schwarzenegger, 
himself an immigrant, ordered 224 nati- 
onal Guard troops to the U.s.-mexico 
border to help with border security.
Beefing Up Border security
A big recruiting push for the Border Patrol was prompted 
by the Bush Administration between 2006 and 2008. Some 
6,000 National Guard troops were sent to four states that 
border Mexico. Operation “Jump Start” was a quite delayed 
response to post-September 11th attacks and emphasized 
preventing suspected terrorists or weapons of mass 
destruction from entering the United States. Guard troops 
also helped build roads and fences in addition to backing 
up law enforcement officers at the border. They contributed 
to the arrest of more than 162,000 illegal immigrants, 
the rescue of 100 people stranded in the desert and the 
seizure of 69,000 dollars in cash and 305,000 pounds of 
illicit drugs.46 
President Obama has also been beefing up the numbers 
at the U.S.-Mexico border, ordering some 1,200 National 
Guardsmen to help fight drug traffickers 
and other border criminality. He also asked 
Congress in June 2010 for funds to hire 
another one thousand Border Patrol agents, 
two drone airplanes, and enhance security. 
Some of the money was earmarked for ballistic and DNA 
analysis for Mexican law enforcement officials.47 This push 
to increase troops is in anticipation of burnishing the 
administration’s border security credentials while pursuing 
some form of immigration reform in the run-up to the 
November 2010 midterm elections. In addition, even 
Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, himself an immigrant to 
the U.S. from Austria, ordered 224 National Guard troops 
to the U.S.-Mexico border to help with border security.48 
In addition to the human resources necessary to patrol 
the border, various parts of the U.S.-Mexico border have 
been fortified. Working in the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) 
46 | Randal C. Archibald, “Obama to Send Up to 1,200 Troops to 
 Border”, in: New York Times, May 26, 2010, A1.
47 | Peter Nicholas and Nicole Santa Cruz, “Obama Seeks Border 
 Funds”, in: L.A. Times, June 23, 2010, A1.
48 | Michael Gardner, “Governor sending 224 Nat’l Guard troops 
 to border”, in: Sign on San Diego, July 15, 2010, 
 http://signonsandiego.com/news/2010/jul/15/governor-
 sending-224-natl-guard-troops-border, (accessed July 15, 2010).
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Under the secure fence act, the de-
partment of homeland security cons-
tructs more than 700 miles of border 
wall, including areas of protected fe-
deral lands, habitat for endangered 
species, and other natural resources.
is the federal agency responsible for securing the country’s 
borders along and between ports of entry. 
In November 2005, DHS announced the launch of the 
Secure Border Initiative (SBI), a multiyear, multibillion-
dollar program aimed at securing U.S. borders and reducing 
illegal immigration. This system features SBInet a system 
that employs radars, sensors, and cameras to detect, 
identify, and classify the threat level associated with an 
illegal entry into the United States between 
the ports of entry. The system also creates 
the SBI tactical infrastructure: fencing, 
roads, and lighting intended to enhance the 
ability of Border Patrol agents to respond and 
arrest an illegal entrant. 
Under the Secure Fence Act, the U.S. Congress directed 
that the DHS construct more than 700 miles of border wall 
along the southwestern border, including numerous areas 
of protected federal lands, habitat for threatened and 
endangered species, and other natural resources. CBP had 
completed about 73 miles of primary SBI fencing costing 
approximately 198 million dollars as of September 30, 
2007, and about 215 miles of fencing costing about 625 
million dollars as of October 31, 2008. Seventy-one of the 
miles completed as of September 30, 2007, were pedes-
trian fencing completed at costs ranging from 400.000 
to 4.8 million dollars per mile and averaging 2.8 million 
dollars per mile. CBP had also finished about two miles 
of vehicle fencing at a cost of 2.8 million dollars. Pedes-
trian fencing accounted for 140 of the miles that CBP had 
completed as of October 31, 2008, with costs ranging from 
400,000 to 15.1 million dollars per mile for an average 
of 3.9 million dollars per mile. Seventy-five of the miles 
were vehicle fencing and costs ranged from 200,000 to 
1.8 million dollars per mile, averaging 1.0 million dollars 
per mile. The per mile costs to build the fencing varied 
considerably because of the type of fencing, topography, 
materials used, land acquisition costs, and labor costs. 
In 2009, CBP obligated 58 million dollars of fiscal year 
2008 SBI funds to construct approximately 3.5 miles of 
secondary fencing in the San Diego sector at an average 
cost of about 16 million dollars per mile. This per mile cost 
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The mérida initiative is designed to dis-
rupt the capacity of organized crime to 
operate, strengthen institutions, build 
a twenty first century border, and build 
strong and resilient communities.
is substantially higher than the cost for existing secondary 
fencing because of the difficult terrain where the secondary 
fencing is to be built. Some parts of the fence constructed 
in the mid-1990s near the San Ysidro Port of Entry are 
made from recycled pieces of the tarmac from airstrips 
built in the 1991 Gulf Conflict.
The contracts to build the fence along the U.S.-Mexico 
border is highly lucrative as is the contract to supply the 
U.S. Government with drone airplanes and other technol-
ogies to stem the flow of illegal immigrants in the United 
States. But the militarization of the border does not end 
there. It now continues in Mexico as the U.S. Government 
provides funding of Mexican military and security forces 
through the Mérida Initiative.
The mérida initiative
All hopes for increased public security in border cities have 
been pinned on the Mérida Initiative, an aid package for 
Mexico that was negotiated between Mexican President 
Calderón and former U.S. President George 
W. Bush in March 2007. A total of 1.4 billion 
dollars over three years is being channeled 
from the U.S. Government to the Mexican 
Government to fund the purchase of airplanes 
and helicopters for surveillance, counternar-
cotics, and counterterrorism operations by the Mexican 
military and for the purchase of scanners and armed 
vehicles, the establishment of law enforcement databases, 
the training of specialized police units to combat organized 
crime and anti-corruption activities of the federal police. 
This program, like some extra aid that the U.S. Department 
of Defense provides, is designed to disrupt the capacity 
of organized crime to operate, strengthen institutions 
that sustain the rule of law and human rights, build a 
twenty first century border, and build strong and resilient 
communities.49 
49 | U.S. Embassy, “Mérida Initiative at a Glance”, 
 http://www.usembassy-mexico.gov/eng/merida/emerida_
 factsheet_meridapillars.html (accessed May 11, 2010).
55KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS10|2010
There is even a public television chan-
nel in Tijuana dedicated to the traffic 
patterns to go into the United states. 
Tens of thousands of people cross that 
border daily.
The Mérida Initiative is a Mexican version of what Colombia 
enjoyed in over 5 billion dollars’ worth of black helicopters 
and other high tech equipment including support aircraft 
and satellite technology to track drug shipments  – a “Plan 
Colombia Light” of sorts but without as many death 
squads. Under the Mérida Initiative,50 police intelligence 
gathering capabilities and institution building have been 
supplemented with funds from the U.S. Treasury. The 
Mexican authorities have even requisitioned a submarine 
to counter the strategic fleet that Colombian traffickers 
have been able to build and deploy.51 
But with great gear, comes great responsibility. The 
Mérida Initiative legislation provides that that some of 
the money to be spent on troops or agents may only be 
released after four human rights reporting requirements 
are met. The military has also been accused of corruption 
with the Sinaloa cartel. Violence has spread from the U.S.-
Mexico border region to the rest of the country as drug 
cartels fight it out ought over supply routes and domestic 
control of trafficking. Criminality along the U.S.-Mexico 
border further exacerbated the rise of Central American 
gangs – the maras of San Salvador, Los Angeles, Houston, 
and Tegucigalpa. These organized criminal organizations 
ratchet up the level of violence and are involved in drug 
and human smuggling throughout the region. 
a snapshoT of The UniTed sTaTes-mexiCo BoRdeR
The San Ysidro Port of Entry remains the most 
heavily trafficked pedestrian crossing in the 
world. Crossing is a part of life – the bifur-
cated, bi-national identities that hundreds of 
thousands of residents on both sides of the 
U.S.-Mexico border share. There is even a public television 
channel in Tijuana dedicated to the traffic patterns to go 
into the United States. Tens of thousands of people cross 
that border daily, going to work, to study at school, to get 
medical services, to attend religious services, and to visit 
relatives.
50 | June S. Beittel, Mexico’s Drug-Related Violence, n. 18. 
51 | Frank Bajak, Associated Press, “DEA: Seized Submarine 
 Quantum Leap for Narcos”, in: ABC News International, 
 July 4, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory
 ?id=11087367 (accessed July 20, 2010).
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poverty rates and lower socio-econo-
mic indicators increase within close 
proximity to the U.s.-mexico border. 
The huge economic cold that the U.s. 
caught made mexico even sicker.
Some of the border crossers make their way to shopping 
malls to spend the money that was generated by NAFTA. 
This conspicuous group of Mexican consumers – some 
upper class but mostly upper middle class – has the 
financial wherewithal to maintain a life in the United States 
(as well as one in Mexico) or to merely visit shops that sell 
designer goods without fears of kidnapping or shootouts. 
Mexicans spend some four billion dollars annually in San 
Diego County. They are fast filling the retail zones around 
the border area – both as employees and shoppers. The 
U.S. is a destination for shopping for Mexicans for a 
number of reasons. Firstly is the selection – with a market-
place of 300 million people there is much more of a market 
selection. Prices are lower due to the lower tariff rates for 
luxury goods in the U.S. compared to those same goods 
imported into Mexico. There is a lower tax rate as well in 
the United States. The shopping malls around San Diego 
are filled with Mexican families hitting Banana Republic, 
Bloomingdales, Macy’s, and Nordstrom. The financial crisis 
has put a dent into this, but not by much. 
Legitimate goods are shipped across the border at the 
checkpoint in the eastern delegación of Tijuana called 
Otay Mesa. Illicit goods are taken in smaller packages by 
the so-called ant traffic of border crossers forced into the 
deserts of Arizona for a four-day trek due to increased 
vigilance in the San Diego-Tijuana sector or through the 
ubiquitous tunnels that run under the border. One group 
of workers who would like to provide more services on the 
U.S. side of the border are Mexican truckers, who continue 
to ply their way north, despite some temporary setbacks. 
U.S. drivers and regulators of the nation’s highways will 
have to learn to not fear those truckers; a pilot program 
during the Bush Administration demonstrated that Mexican 
truckers scored better on safety than U.S. truckers. 
A true leveling of the playing field is not 
exactly around the corner, but steps are 
being taken to converge our markets. This 
includes more common security initiatives: 
The Security and Prosperity Partnership of 
North America, a set of agreements and communiqués from 
the three NAFTA Parties, which started in 2005 and offered 
many objectives for harmonization of laws and procedures. 
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The War on drugs has survived the 
Contra affair, diplomatic relations fias-
cos, and coups d’etat. it was fought in 
Central america in the 1980s and now 
it is being waged in mexico.
Its results are still unclear. There is indeed still much to 
be done to fortify the borders of all partner countries and 
to develop the border region as a whole. It is no secret 
that poverty rates and lower socio-economic indicators 
increase within close proximity to the U.S.-Mexico border. 
The huge economic cold that the U.S. caught made Mexico 
even sicker. One can only hope that further growth can 
be generated along the U.S.-Mexico border without the 
same social dislocation costs that have wracked the region 
earlier, and without threatening the national security of 
both countries. 
But the U.S. must stop addressing the issues that it faces 
only as supply-side problems: It blames the supply of 
immigrants from Mexico on Mexico and does not punish 
those in the United States who employ illegal immigrants 
in order to pay lower wages. Similarly, there is much 
focus on stemming the supply of drugs rather than trying 
to go after U.S. demand. There needs to be enforcement 
of employer sanctions enacted by the 1986 Immigration 
Reform and Control Act before we even start thinking about 
immigration reform in the United States. President George 
W. Bush was unable to do it with his proposed three-year 
guest worker program and Senator John McCain’s support 
for reform. It is unlikely that President Barak Obama will 
win much by dealing with what has become the third rail 
of politics.
For its part, the Mexican Government must do something to 
encourage economic growth. There also remains the issue 
of how to best tackle drug cartel violence. 
Since December 2006 when President Felipe 
Calderón assumed power, the Mexican drug 
war has become more militarized and less 
a matter of law enforcement with investi-
gation, prosecution, and the rule of law. The 
U.S.-Mexico border has now become a battle zone in the 
War on Drugs that the United States has been waging for 
decades. First launched by President Richard Nixon and 
heightened during the Reagan Administration, this “war” 
has continued since the 1970s. It has seen millions of 
convicted people go through the prison industrial complex, 
brought endemic corruption throughout nations and their 
institutions, and has armed military forces throughout 
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Latin America with high technology weapon and intelli-
gence systems. The War on Drugs has survived the Contra 
Affair, diplomatic relations fiascos, and coups d’etat. It 
was fought in Central America in the 1980s and now it 
is being waged in Mexico. There are some forty thousand 
troops on the streets there. Luckily, little of the violence 
from Mexican drug war has flowed into the United States, 
but with the presence of narcotraficantes in all major U.S. 
cities, this too may change.52
52 | Nicholas Riccardi, “Quiet border towns don‘t live up to their 
 notoriety”, in: L.A. Times, May 13, 2010, A1.
